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ABSTRACT   
 
Growing commercial activities in the High North increase the 
possibility of unwanted incidents. The vulnerability related to human 
safety and environment as well as a challenging context, call for a 
strengthening of the maritime preparedness system, cross-border and 
cross-institutional collaboration. In this paper, we look into the 
different stressors and risk factors of the sea regions in the High North. 
We elaborate on emergencies where integrated operations like mass 
evacuation is needed. We build upon in-depth studies of two cruise ship 
incidents close to the Spitsbergen Islands, and full-scale exercises in the 
Arctic region. We claim that coordination of such operations where 
several institutions and management levels are included demands 
significant integration and communication efforts. Implications for the 
training of key personnel responsible for coordinating such operations 
are discussed. 
 
KEY WORDS: Maritime preparedness system; integrated emergency 
operations; High North; cross-border cooperation; competence and 
training. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Emergency situations are often characterized by lack of overview and 
uncertainty about cause, consequences and suitable safety barriers. In 
areas like the High North, due to limited infrastructure and the scarcity 
of emergency capacities, a simple emergency situation can quickly turn 
into a crisis involving significant risk for people, nature and vulnerable 
societies.  The turbulent weather conditions facing emergency actors, 
makes rescue and relief operations a challenging and time consuming 
task. In this paper, we examine how the emergency management has to 
be configured to overcome challenges related to large-scale 
emergencies with limited local infrastructure, long distances and harsh 
weather conditions in icy waters. In addition, we consider the limited 
availability of emergency support systems and the time delays caused 
by the geographical distances. 
By examining the various emergency situations we reflect on suitable 
composition of the infrastructure, emergency groupings, and 
coordination mechanism. 
 
THEORY 
 
Emergency Management and Emergency Response Pattern 
 
High levels of uncertainty combined with a need for fast and reliable 
action are the main characteristic of emergencies (Kyng, Nielsen, and 
Kristensen 2006). Major incidents like shootouts and terror action, or 
cruise ship groundings with mass rescue operations (MRO) are 
categorized by lack of sufficient resources to meet the emergency 
situation. These situations are often chaotic and stressful with a large 
number of causalities, and a mix of SAR capacities. Thus, obtaining 
and maintaining an overview for such an incident become extremely 
hard for the coordinators and the different levels of command.  
 
According to Borch and Andreassen (2015), emergency management is 
regarded as a tightly knit interplay between different management 
levels from the strategic level and operational headquarters down to the 
on-scene coordinator and incident commander. This calls for attention 
on roles and capabilities at all decision levels and the horizontal and 
vertical interaction patterns. Uncertainties and conflicts over the roles 
between the levels might influence negatively on managers’ 
performance. In extreme environment, a huge number of aspects 
towards a broader range of stakeholders has to be taken into 
consideration (Mintzberg, 2009). Not the least, the next in kin and 
media pressure will be extremely high and will demand extra focus and 
more roles to fill. 
 
A managerial role can be defined as a set of actions and 
responsibilities. Mintzberg (1973) suggested that the managerial roles 
within an organization can be categorized into three key categories: 
interpersonal, decisional and informational.                
 
 The interpersonal roles cover the relationships that a manager needs to 
have with others. It involves three roles named as figurehead, leader 
and liaison. The figurehead role involves internal motivation and 
inspiration. It also represents the crisis organization externally towards 
different stakeholders. According to leader’s roles, managers have to 
reflect on the needs of an organization and those of the individuals they 
manage and work with. The third interpersonal role, which is liaison, 
deals with the ‘horizontal’ relationships to other emergency and support 
agencies. Contact and coordination outside the vertical chain of 
command are referred to as the liaison’s role. 
 
The processing of information is a key part of the managers’ duty. 
Managers must collect, disseminate information and these activities 
have three corresponding informational roles: monitor, disseminator 
and spokesperson. By means of interpersonal contacts, these roles are 
essential in an organizational unit. Managers have to scan the 
environments continuously to seek and receive information about both 
internal and external events and transmit it to subordinates and others. 
Constant information flow is critical in order to be able to allocate 
resources and achieve efficient mitigating actions with lowest possible 
risk to the personnel.  
 
The decisional roles involve the entrepreneurial action, disturbance 
handling, resource allocation, and negotiator roles. Information is the 
basic input for managers to make decisions. In the entrepreneurial role, 
managers search for improvement the unit to adopt it to changing 
conditions in the environment. They also respond to high-pressure 
disturbances and handle ad hoc problems. In the resource allocator role, 
managers make decisions about how to allocate people, budget, 
equipment, time and other resources to attain desired outcome.  
 
Quick decisions may be critical to meet dynamism in the environment. 
In stable organizations, formal duties descriptions may contribute to 
harmonized action. On the other hand, in a crisis organization, the 
defined standard operating procedures that have functioned well in the 
past may not be appropriate (Rosenthal et al., Boin and Comfort, 2001). 
Thus, in organizations facing volatile environments, there is a need for 
innovation and entrepreneurial, dynamic capabilities related to specific 
persons or integrated into the present roles (Borch and Madsen, 2007). 
The operational and tactical management may have to improvise and 
work on reconfiguration, including new action pattern, repositioning of 
resources and up linking to other roles and processes. This is of critical 
importance in emergency situations that run through several phases, 
that each may run over a long time span.  
 
Different Emergency Phases  
 
In this paper, emergency situations are divided into four phases 
according to IAEM (2009): Prevention, Preparation, Response, and 
Recovery. The main characteristics of these phases are: 
 
Prevention: Preventing a disaster or its consequences should be the 
prime directive for every organization or administration involved in 
emergency management (EM) procedures. Early warning, forecasting, 
and monitoring systems have improved significantly over the past 
decennium, mainly due to improved communication and positioning 
capacities. The most crucial factor in disaster prevention is time. The 
earlier an upcoming threat is known the better people and organizations 
can apply countermeasures to prevent a hazardous outcome. This 
means that all involved EM organizations and authorities must plan 
ahead to identify preventative and protective measures before a 
situation escalates (Van de Walle and Turoff et al., 2009; Wisner and 
Adams, 2003). 
 
Preparation: If a critical situation cannot be prevented and starts to 
expand, being prepared for it is the second most important phase. 
Unfortunately, one cannot be prepared for every kind of emergency. 
Even if a disaster is of the same kind its severity, extent, and progress 
cannot be rehearsed in every facet. The situation, however, can be 
compared to a football game. Each game for itself is unique; though, 
endurance, strength, fitness, health and the knowledge of different 
tactics can influence the outcome of a game significantly. The same 
principle can be applied in emergency management. Preparing for the 
unknown by providing reliable equipment and tools, having a good 
organizational structure, educating the team, and having a repertoire of 
best practices can be crucial in hazardous situations. Nevertheless, it is 
essential that all levels of government and volunteers undertake a 
thorough vulnerability analysis, which assesses the variety in types, 
impact, and frequency to formulate possible regulations and emergency 
plans (Turoff, et al., 2009; Wisner and Adams, 2003).  
 
In case of an unforeseen disaster the response teams and emergency 
managers have to act as fast as possible to prevent additional damage. 
Preparation can help to mitigate the consequences in first place but fast 
ad-hoc decisions are needed to react to such a threat and moderate its 
impact. The faster and more precise a decision can be made on a 
strategic and operational level the faster the tactical teams can react 
(Turoff, et al., 2009). This demands adequate and timely information 
(Iannella and Henricksen, 2007) as well as fast reliable information and 
proper logistics, infrastructure maintenance, and supply management 
(Wisner and Adams, 2003). 
 
Resource Configuration 
To achieve high performance, an operation has to be supported by 
appropriate resources and distinct competencies (Barney, 2002). The 
resource-based view of the organization emphasizes the significance of 
an organization’s unique or distinctive resources, and how they are 
pooled together to achieve superior performance (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Black and Boal, 1994).  
 
However, resources may not be easily accessible or it may take time to 
develop them within own organization. Special challenges are present 
if you need resources that are rare, costly to buy or copy, and less 
mobile (Barney, 1991; 2001). The lack of available technology and 
managerial competences means that the organizations have to build 
resources on their own, or enter into cooperation with other 
organization that may have some of this capability. Through host-
nation support schemes the emergency coordination centers may 
mobilize support from neighboring countries in major incidents and 
regions where resources are scarce. 
 
At operational level, the managers’ task will be to decide upon the 
resources needed and how they should be bundled together. Basic 
resources refer to resources such as skilled workers, machines and 
financial capital. Capabilities are combinations of physical resources 
and individual competence bundled in the organization to provide a 
special output (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  
 
Another type of resources is the dynamic capability emphasizing the 
organizations’ ability to adopt or innovate, i.e. capabilities to develop 
new resources, to reconfigure new and existing resources and remove 
abundant resources to improve efficiency (Teece et al., 1997; Borch 
and Madsen, 2007). By identifying, utilizing, and recombining valuable 
assets, the organization should be able to meet unforeseen challenges, 
increase operational effectiveness and keep the costs down. In complex 
and volatile environments, managers have to be efficient on the 
specified tasks of an operation in coordinated action with other 
organizations.  Thus, the managers have to be eloquent in both 
 exploiting present resources, and in exploring new ones to meet new 
challenges, all performed in a different context (Black and Boal, 1994; 
March, 1991, Borch, 1994). Therefore, the operational efficiency is 
dependent on the configuration of physical resources, human 
capabilities and managerial core competence to prosper in the volatile 
and highly complex environment of regions such as the High North. 
 
The Importance of Context 
The operational environment of the High North is characterized as both 
complex and volatile (Borch and Batalden, 2014). The High North is 
defined as the geographical regions north of the Polar Circle where 
maritime operations are challenged by long physical distances to 
civilization, limited harbor infrastructure, low temperatures with ice, 
icing, polar lows, and vulnerable nature. This calls for extra 
competence and capabilities for all activity in this region (Gudmestad 
et al., 1999; Thunem, 2010).  In the High North the instability 
parameter denotes the difficulties the actors face on predicting nature, 
and the functionality of available resources, among others due to 
different cultures, political interests and training. In emergency systems 
there are capabilities that are needed for response to mitigate the crisis. 
The resource challenges are present both related to equipment, 
personnel and organizations (Comfort and Kapucu, 2001).  
 
Institutional factors 
Formal institutional elements are important in the Arctic region. One 
factor present is the political sensitivity present with shared 
responsibility between the Arctic countries on emergencies, including 
the USA, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway and 
Russia. The Arctic states are committed to several bilateral and 
multilateral agreements in relation to certain emergency preparedness 
activities. The question of emergency preparedness in the High North 
has a primary focus on search and rescue operations, and on 
preparedness for pollution caused by extensive maritime activities from 
shipping, fisheries, offshore petroleum installations and maritime 
tourism.  
 
From May 2011, search and rescue operations in the High North are 
governed by the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. The responsibility is  
assigned to  the eight Arctic states. The responsibility of oil spill 
response in the High North is coordinated by the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic since 2013. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) is the international treaty created at the third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. These international 
agreements demonstrate the commitment for joint coordination of 
emergency response in the Arctic.  
 
Unfortunately, climate change and its unpredictable consequences 
make emergency response in the region complicated. We still lack 
knowledge on how these composite contextual elements may influence 
the operational interaction between the institutions within the 
preparedness system.  
 
Resources for providing effective emergency response in the Arctic are 
limited (Arctic Council, 2009). There is limited police authority present 
to deal with violent action. Having limited resources countries depend 
on each other’s help.  
 
Host Nation Support 
There is a broad political consensus to maintain the high priority of an 
effective SAR services with focus on cross-border support or the so-
called Host Nation Support. HNS can be defined as civil or military 
assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory 
during crisis and emergencies based on agreements concluded between 
nations. The consent of Host Nation Support was developed by 
international organization Red Crescent National Society, the UN 
Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and European 
Union (EU) (DSB, 2014). 
 
Host Nation Support uses mainly four principle for interaction within 
crisis management in case of assistance from abroad; responsibility, 
equality, subsidiarity and interaction. The principle states that the 
organization responsible for an area manages the response in case of a 
crisis. The equality principle states that an organization in emergency 
should be as similar as possible to this organization during its day-to-
day activities. The subsidiarity principle states that crisis should be 
managed at the lowest organizational level. The interaction principle 
states that the governments, businesses, or agencies are responsible to 
ensure the best possible cooperation between relevant actors and 
organization in all phases of emergency management (DSB, 2014).  
The criteria for host nation support and inland emergency management 
put a heavy strain especially on the coordinators at each level of 
command within emergency situations balancing different types of 
resources and allocating command and responsibility for different 
managerial tasks and roles.  
 
CASES 
 
Cruise ship Maxim Gorkiy. 1989. Greenland Sea, near 
Svalbard/ Spitsbergen 
 
The accident of the cruise ship Maxim Gorkiy has become a vivid 
illustration to the question of tourism safety at sea in harsh Arctic 
conditions and has been discussed widely (Svalbardposten, 1989, 2014; 
Kvamsad et all, 2009; Hovden, 2012, Marchenko, 2015). 
 
On the way from Iceland to Magdalena fjord (North Spitsbergen) at 
around midnight of 19 June 1989, the Maxim Gorkiy hit an ice floe and 
begun to sink rapidly. It happened in the Greenland Sea, 60 nm (111 
km) west of Spitsbergen. There were 575 passengers and 378 
crewmembers onboard, totally 953 people. All passengers and a third 
of the crew had to abandon the ship. The situation was quite dramatic 
while they were waiting for help on the ice floes and lifeboats, 
surrounded by drifting ice. The Norwegian coast guard vessel Senja 
happened to sail in Svalbard area and receiving midnight call was 
dispatched to assist immediately. A P3-Orion surveillance plane from 
the Norwegian Air Force came to the location and served as air 
coordinator. CV Senja arrived on scene three hours later, when the 
Maxim Gorkiy was already partially submerged. The passengers were 
evacuated from the lifeboats and ice floes by helicopters and the Senja., 
taken to Svalbard and later flown back to Germany. Meanwhile the 
crew of the cruise ship and CV Senja had managed to stop the Maxim 
Gorkiy’s sinking. On 21 June, the Maxim Gorkiy was towed to 
Svalbard, where quick repairs were made to make her watertight 
enough to survive a return to Germany for repairs. 
The Norwegian forces with the commander of CV as on-scene-
coordinator were keeping close contact through the navigator staff and 
radio communication officer at CV Senja. However, it was difficult to 
communicate with forces from other countries including Russian 
surveillance planes and helicopters. These units communicated directly 
with the cruise ship captain in Russian, causing challenges both to the 
correct use of resources and air safety. The aircraft also used different 
channels for communication.  
 
Cruise ship Hanseatic. 1997. Murchinson fjorden, Northern 
Svalbard 
 
 The Hanseatic case was of a smaller scale (less people involved), so it 
is not well known. (Mellgren, 1997).  
 
On 13 July 1997, the cruise ship Hanseatic (Germany), was stuck in 
Murchinson fjorden in the Hinlopen Strait, a passage between the 
Spitsbergen and Nordaustlandet islands (210 km from Longyearbyen). 
There were 145 passengers and 115 crew. The captain tried to approach 
land at risky distance to show walruses to the tourists. The ship had left 
a measured shipping lane through Rossøysundet and passed close to the 
land in Beinbukta, where it went on a cutting sticking up above sea 
level only 20-30 meters from the ship railing. Hanseatic ran aground 
with a heel of nine degrees. All passengers were evacuated to the land 
by lifeboats and transported further to Longyearbyen by the coast guard 
ship Tromsø. The Norwegian Coast Guard coordinated the rescue 
activity. The Hanseatic was grounded for 4 days while the K/V 
Nordkapp took fuel from the Hanseatic (to make the ship lighter and to 
avoid spills) and it helped to extricate the ship. 
 
The reported cause of the accident was navigation mistakes, although 
the captain was very experienced in Arctic navigation. In this case, the 
weather was fine and none of the 260 people on-board was injured due 
to the presence of the coast guard and favorable conditions.   
 
SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 
The SAREX Greenland exercise is aimed at training key personnel 
responsible for SAR coordination of different types of resources in a 
context that included limited infrastructure, long distances and harsh 
weather conditions. The scenario of the 2013-exercise was multi-
faceted. The climate change impact on sea ice extent even in northern 
Greenland has resulted in increasing maritime activity from both cruise 
tourism and prospects for extractive industries in the area. In addition, 
the national, regional, and global political focus on the threat of climate 
change impacts, the capacities of search and rescue (SAR), and oil spill 
response (OSR) in the area was part of the background for the exercise. 
Finally, the relation between SAR resources and the specific Arctic 
context was important for the setting of the area of the exercise because 
the geographical distances and the sparse resources in the vast area 
make transport time for evacuation enormous.  
 
On 4 September 2013 the cruise ship Arctic Victory went missing in the 
Greenland Sea. All ships in the Greenland EEZ are obliged to send a 
message to the GREENPOS system with information on position, 
course, speed, and destination every six hours. When the mandatory 
message from Arctic Victory did not arrive at the Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Nuuk, it notified other Rescue 
Coordination Centers in the High North and asked all available aircrafts 
and surface vessels for a search operation in the Greenland Sea. Next 
day, the Arctic Victory reported its position. However, the day after 
Arctic Victory ran aground near Ella Island in King Oscar’s Fiord with 
all 200 passengers and 50 crewmembers on-board, an explosion in the 
engine room resulted in multiple injuries, fire on-board and tilting of 
the ship. Hence, the need arose for an extensive rescue operation to 
save the crew and the passengers who either were on-board the vessel 
or had entered the vessel’s life rafts.  
 
Fig. 1. Ella Island and King Oscar Fjord map 
The biggest challenges during the exercise were communication with 
and coordination of a huge multinational search and rescue effort in the 
high Arctic. The report concluded that it should be investigated whether 
MRCC Nuuk had all the needed communication systems at disposal for 
a SAR operation of this size. In addition, increased capacity was 
recommended including a fixed wing search aircraft be on SAR alert in 
Greenland throughout the summer season in addition to the available 
helicopter capacity. Moreover, it was recommended to test mobile 
satellite internet transceiver solutions for their capability, since reliable 
means of communication were a major problem during the exercise. 
Furthermore, a standard operational procedure for local emergency 
plane for casualty assemblies should be developed, and also that a 
formal SAR cooperation agreement between the national coordination 
forums at the strategic level in Greenland and Iceland were established. 
The handling of the large number of aircraft during the exercise 
produced the recommendation of establishing an air-task organization 
as part of the contingency plans of the Joint Arctic Command in Nuuk. 
The proper handling of media and the press also became an urgent 
problem during the exercise, Therefore, it was recommended that a 
communication plan for future purposes were developed and that 
training media and press handling both internally and with external 
counterparts was continued. It was regards as essential that information 
was spread to stakeholders and the interested public in general (Joint 
Arctic Command 2013). This was especially important in an area with 
political sensitivity and a broad range of stakeholders such as the 
indigenous people. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We have used the real data from presented cases for our analysis. At 
the end of this section, our suggested analytical model is presented. The 
table below shows the overview of the three cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1. Overview of three cases 
 
 
 
The dramatic Maxim Gorky cruise ship accident demonstrates the 
challenges and potential consequences of lack of information when 
conducting mass evacuation coordination and planning in extreme 
environment. It illuminates the cultural differences related to 
cooperation, including language problems.  
 
In the Hanseatic case, the long distance to nearest settlement, icy 
condition and poor communication caused difficulties for the SAR 
operation. The challenge of transporting a large group of passengers is 
critical in this region. In addition, the presence of coast guard 
emergency platform with a broad range of capacities including both 
logistics, communication and specialized competence on SAR and oil 
spill was crucial in mitigating the effects. 
 
In the SAREX exercise, it soon became clear that a full evacuation was 
necessary. Therefore, the condition and infrastructure of the area of 
operation for search and rescue became essential. Evacuees had to be 
transported in small boats on-shore Ella Island, then by helicopters to 
the military facilities of Mestersvig Airstrip, and then onwards by large 
aircrafts to Iceland, where the nearest hospital with sufficient capacity 
was located. The distance from Mestersvig to Reykjavik in Iceland is 
approximately 1.000 km. The conditions for this exercise were 
certainly extreme but still not unrealistic. Cruise ships of this size do go 
this far north in remote areas in spite of the Eastern coast being 
unpopulated except from two smaller towns and a number of even 
smaller settlements with very limited medical or paramedical resources. 
This incidence demonstrated that evacuation destinations are the key 
problem. It also demonstrated that resources are present and could be 
mobilized from immediate response forces from Greenland and Iceland 
such as offshore patrol vessels, maritime surveillance aircrafts, 
neighboring countries air support, local helicopters and other assistance 
are available in the area. However, there would be a time-lag that may 
prove critical in harsh weather. The capacities of the vessels in distress 
are therefore critical. Thus, the new Polar code stresses that the vessels 
should manage to keep the passengers and crews alive and well for five 
days in cases of critical incidents. This calls for both significant 
increase in equipment onboard as well as training for a broad range of 
safety personnel on-board.  
 
Crisis Context and Emergency Management 
The crisis context as to weather, distances to incident site, and number 
of persons in distress influence on the emergency management. In mass 
evacuation operations such as the Maxim Gorkiy case, with many 
passengers sitting on the ice floes at the same time as the vessel risked 
sinking with a large number of crew on-board, made the logistics 
planning and priorities crucial. Our case confirmed that it was not easy 
to plan all possible details for the rescue operation and it was 
complicated to take aboard from the ice. Salvage of the vessel to secure 
crew increased complexity. Distances make response time uncertain. 
Mobilizing all resources available as soon as possible is imminent and 
demands knowledge of all resources including other nations support 
capacities.  
 
The incidents with larger ships such as cruise vessels or oil installations 
put the entire national preparedness system to the test (Marchenko, 
2015). In our cases, the limited visibility, summer fog, dynamic water 
condition, and floating blocks of ice, made it challenging to rescue the 
passengers of the wrecked ships. As for visibility, the two incidents 
happened in summer, so the polar night was not present in the Arctic 
region, otherwise the situation could have been much worse.  
 
The infrastructure and resources capacities are crucial when it comes to 
emergency situations in the High North. Long distance, lack of suitable 
means of communication and poorly developed SAR facilities and 
services make emergencies more difficult to manage (Kvamstad et al, 
2009). Borch et al., 2015 describes the limited emergency resources 
capacity and the increased activity level in the region. In cases, limited 
capacity of resources, both in terms of helicopters and aircrafts and 
their flying capacity influenced the emergency situations. In the Maxim 
Gorkiy case, the first responder arrived at the site of the accident after 4 
hours due to favorable circumstances.  
 
In 1989, the coast guard vessel did not have satellite communication 
facilities. Around Svalbard, there were established military 
communication lines with poor signal. Kvamstad et al. (2009) 
highlighted that getting access to necessary information and dependable 
means of communication are crucial for any emergency operation in 
High North. Currently, the challenges may be connected to the problem 
of intensive load on communication lines, and therefore the principle of 
information priority has become important in emergency management, 
especially in the High North where the satellite communication can be 
limited. Additionally, the language problems of different nationalities 
can cause challenges in SAR coordination on-scene. In the Maxim 
Gorkiy case, Norwegian coast guard as on-scene commander was not 
able to communicate with Russian military and civilian helicopters and 
airplanes due to language problem and lack of joint procedures 
(Hovden, 2012).  
 
Crisis Type, Resources and Emergency Management 
All three cases have confirmed that there is a need for dynamic 
capabilities related to acquiring for new resources, teaming old and new 
resources and finding new solutions in high ambiguity settings. 
 
        Cases 
 
Feature  
Maxim Gorkiy 
Summer 
Hanseatic 
Summer 
Arctic Victory  
Autumn 
People on 
board  
953 260 250 
Phase and 
type of 
Emergency 
Response Phase- 
Unexpected  
Response 
Phase- 
Waveform  
Response Phase- 
Unexpected 
Problem Hitting an ice Stuck in fjord Lost, Engine 
explosion. fire on 
board 
Cause Captain’s decision to 
cross an ice field 
while keeping 
significant speed 
Navigation 
mistakes 
No information 
available  
Challenges - lack information,   
lack of support from 
ashore and 
communication  
between Russian and 
Norwegian rescue 
team 
- 2 km wide ice field 
with about 1m 
thickness- The 
cultural and 
language differences 
between Russian and 
Norwegian crew 
- poor VHF channel 
communication 
- long distance 
to the nearest 
settlement 
Longyearbyen 
- ice  conditions 
on site, that 
made rescue 
efforts difficult 
- poor VHF 
channel 
communication 
- long distance 
-  communication 
with and 
coordinating of a 
huge multinational 
search and rescue 
- harsh Climate  
- coordination of 
large number of 
aircrafts 
-media handling 
-information to 
stakeholders 
 Human resources and management competence in the High North can 
be considered difficult to obtain. This is due to a broad range of 
knowledge, long time experience and intensive training that are needed 
to cope with the challenges. To achieve this objective we need 
increased knowledge accumulation and knowledge transfer across 
institutions and borders to facilitate transparency in emergency 
response management. Training in improvisation on site is important 
for competence building. The cases have shown that we risk 
incompetent actions and failures, and loss of effects of valuable and 
scarce capacities. In particular, there is a need for clear design of 
training schemes and large-scale, combined exercises. This lead to 
increase understanding on management of capabilities needed at 
operational, tactical and strategic levels in high-risk operations in the 
High North. 
 
Host Nation Support Network and Emergency Management 
Mobilizing all the available resources was very crucial in all of the 
presented cases. In the Maxim Gorkiy case, passengers were moved to 
unstable ice floes and if the vessel sank, there were still crew on-board 
the ship that had to be evacuated fast. The accident occurred in a region 
with well-equipped local communities both in the Russian village of 
Barentsburg and Longeyarbyen. Even though the cold war had 
hampered the cooperation between Norway and Soviets, there had been 
good cooperative relations between Norwegian and Soviets authorities 
at Svalbard.  
 
The formal agreements and joint practices were, however, limited. The 
first bilateral agreement between Norway and Russia on search and 
rescue came in 1995 and opened for annual exercises. In the Maksim 
Gorkiy case, the absence of routine for cooperation and means of 
communication between the Russian and Norwegian units, prevented 
the Russian side from participating actively in a coordinated SAR 
operation, even though Russian helicopters resources and surveillance 
aircraft were on site. Nevertheless, in SAREX and Hanseatic case 
communication challenges were present due to limited radio 
communication capacities in the region, as were the presence of 
languages problems. Much of the same communication challenges are 
still present in spite of increased political focus, R&D efforts and joint 
exercises (Kvamstad et al., 2009; Borch, 2015).  
 
The emergency management must be skilled in the language and 
culture of the neighboring countries, in addition to understanding 
technological capabilities in the specific maritime context. Moreover, 
they should know the capabilities and limitations of the personnel 
involved. These capabilities have to be present for emergency 
managers within logistics, staffing, and information and liaison 
personnel at every functional level. In emergency situations, the SAR 
coordinator at the rescue coordination center is at the core of 
operational and needs all the support available from higher authorities 
to speed up decision processes. This calls for well-functioning 
information channel at national levels to the government of supporting 
countries, as well as negotiation skills and fast decision-making skills 
for coordinators at top directorate and ministry levels.  
 
Creating networks in the High North may potentially facilitate the 
cooperation in emergency situations. This can be achievable by 
building trust within emergency actors and strengthening the relations. 
Joint education and research programs may serve as trust-creating 
platforms. As Gausdal (2014) argued, trust has a positive effect on 
relation building where it can be used as a practical vehicle for 
facilitating commitment in development of network procedure.  
Frequent close interactions between actors may lead organizations to 
understand each other’s expertise (Abrams et al., 2003).  
 
As Buck et al. (2006) states, the emphasis should be on shared 
knowledge and technical aspect, a shared vision of response, high level 
of mutual trust, a trained response community with knowledge of each 
others preparedness system, and not the least a collective recognition of 
capabilities and limitations. If these criteria are not met, there may be 
significant challenges in joint emergency operations.  
The model below summarizes the factors that should be integrated into 
emergency management system when a wide range of actors are 
involved in an operation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Analytical Model 
 
CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have highlighted challenges facing the emergency 
preparedness system in the High North. We have emphasized  
emergency operations that calls for mass evacuation of large number of 
people. A general lack of infrastructure for emergency situations, a 
harsh climate, sea ice, and poor communication may cause delays in the 
mobilization of sufficient SAR and relief capacities. Emergency 
management is complicated due to multiple management levels, 
different operational concepts and communication barriers. Extra 
challenges are present when forces from multiple countries are 
involved. People coming from different culture, with different 
languages and different procedural standards may find it increasingly 
difficult to communicate with each other. This calls for additional 
cross- cultural liaison roles, and fast reconfiguration of the roles and 
procedures of the units involved. Both inter-personal, information and 
decision-making capabilities must be scaled up as fast as possible with 
competent personnel that can improvise and find solutions with limited 
resources. 
 
There is a need for preparedness system with broader range of 
managerial competence to face the challenges of complexity and 
volatility in the High North. However, we still lack cross-border 
integrated programs for education, training and exercises in the High 
North. Cooperation between Arctic states may be facilitated through 
developing joint educational and research programs on emergency 
management. Better cross-institutional understanding may emerge from 
close interaction and face-to-face dialogue based on realistic scenarios 
linked to cross-national education and training schemes including both 
universities and professional academies.  
 
The Arctic Council plays and important role in facilitating joint 
 competence platforms. As a third party they can build solid relation 
among nations and contribute to processes toward unified and 
standardized emergency system in the High North. Creating a central 
data repository that contains each nation’s resources and capabilities 
may improve the nation’s awareness and transparency in the 
emergencies. With regard to ship safety, there is a need for special 
training course for operators the Arctic. The polar code regarding five 
days survival requirement creates the platform for competence efforts 
in this area, and calls for cooperation between vessel operators, 
governments and academia. 
 
Limitations and Implications for Further Research 
This study was based on three cases all taking place in favorable 
weather conditions where the outcomes were on the positive side, 
saving all lives and salvaging all the vessels. There should be studies of 
cases and exercises in more extreme conditions and with a scale where 
improvisation and mobilization of resources from a broad range of 
institutions and host nation support are included. This may provide a 
greater focus on tactical and operational level coordination and 
communication issues, especially   related to the on-scene coordinators, 
incident commanders, and the operational and strategic management on 
shore. In addition, there is a need to emphasize the resource 
mobilization, decision-making process and logistics challenges of the 
host nation support cases of the Arctic region.    
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